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Why Does Health Care Regulation Fail?
ROBERT C. CLARK**

In the past two decades in the United States, the percentage of the
gross national product that we have devoted to expenditures on medical care has nearly doubled, to about ten percent. I It is difficult to overstate the importance of this change. It is also difficult to identify the
nature and amount of the benefits that society has thereby bought.
During the same period, death rates in the American population
changed only slightly.2 Certainly, when compared to the enormous improvements in mortality experience during the 150 years before World
War II and the introduction of modem medicine, the recent drop in
death rates has been the merest blip on the graph; and in any event, it
would be a brave statistician indeed who would attribute the change to
improved medical care rather than to other determinants of longevity.
These facts are somewhat puzzling to many people. Equally puzzling is the fact that attempts to find that higher medical care expenditures have produced an overall improvement in specific measures of
morbidity or health status-for example, in the number of individuals
with serious hypertension-have failed, or have produced limited or
unimpressive results.3 Most ordinary people, who tend to think of concrete experiences and examples and to be relatively unmoved by pallid
statistical data, would find it hard to understand or accept the apparent
@1981 by Robert C. Clark. All rights reserved.
* Paper delivered as the Sobeloff Lecture at the University of Maryland School of
Law, April 20, 1981.
** Professor of Law, Harvard University. B.A. 1966, Mayknoll Seminary; Ph.D. 1971,
Columbia University; J.D. 1972, Harvard Law School.
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(100th ed. 1979).
2. Id. at 59, 70, 72 (table no. 104), 79.
3. See, e.g., J. NEWHOUSE & L. FRIEDLANDER,
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implications of these facts. Surely everyone knows some relative or
friend who had a heart attack or other serious condition and "would
not be alive today" were it not for the superduper expensive modem
intensive care unit at the XYZ Hospital. And we all read about developments, like microsurgery, that clearly do represent major advances,
at least in a narrow technical sense. How then, can we make sense of
statistical data that seem to say that our great increases in spending on
medical care have not had an equally great impact on our health?
One approach to answering this question is to assemble particular
studies that illustrate how it can happen that we can spend money on
medical care and yet produce no impact, or even an adverse impact on
health. For example, some researchers found that eighty percent of all
doctor visits are for conditions that will get better by themselves or that
can't get better as a result of any known medical treatment.4 Others
have found that a very small percentage of all hospital patients account
for a very large percentage of hospital costs, and that these people tend
to have chronic or recurrent conditions that do not respond decisively
to medical treatment. 5 And the prestigious medical journal, The New
EnglandJournalofMedicine, recently carried two disturbing articles on
the incidence of iatrogenesis,6 that is, on adverse conditions in patients
that would not have occurred but for the failure to follow approved
medical procedures. Put simply, the researchers found that iatrogenesis
is not a little problem, but a very big one.
In the end, we will want to tote up the significance of studies of
this sort and match them against the clear successes of modem
medicine. It is still necessary to think in terms of aggregates, or total
net effects, not just in anecdotes and particulars, in order to assess the
modem system of medical care.
I think that one sensible conclusion to draw from all the evidence
presently available is that in modem societies the marginal or incremental contribution of medical care to health status is very small.
Doubling the amount a nation spends on medical care does not produce anything like a comparable gain in the health status of its people.
Some health care policymakers have long recognized this basic in4. B. DIXON, BEYOND THE MAGIC BULLET: THE REAL STORY OF MEDICINE 226
(1978).
5. Zook & Moore, High-Cost Users of Medical Care, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 996
(1980).
6. Couch, Tilney, Rayner & Moore, The High Cost of Low-Frequency Events.- The
Anatomy and Economics of Surgical Mishaps, 304 NEW ENG. J. MED. 634 (1981); Steel,
Gertman, Crescenzi & Anderson, latrogenicIllness on a GeneralMedicalService at a University Hospital, 304 NEw ENG. J. MED. 638 (1981).
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sight.7 Virtually all policymakers have recognized the skyrocketing nature of health care costs.8 As a result, we have witnessed an enormous
growth in health care regulation over the last decade or so. Massive
regulatory systems have been introduced to control the entry of new
capital equipment, to limit the use of health care facilities, and to set
prices. Econometricians have done studies of these programs. The results have been meager and disappointing. The Professional Standards

Review Organization (PSRO) law9 -

the federal utilization review

program - seems to have produced a slight drop in health care expenditures, but the savings have been matched by the direct costs of
merely administering the program.'" The certificate of need laws,
which regulate new capital expenditures, seem to have had little or no
effect.II Until very recently, studies indicated that the rate setting programs also had no effect. '2 In the last year or so, however, several studies have shown that these programs have produced some positive
results.13 But don't start cheering: even in most states with effective
rate setting programs, hospital costs are still rising much faster than the
general rate of inflation.14
7. See generally V. FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE? (1974).
8. For example, the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 81 Stat. 2225 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300K (1976)), was in part
created to check the growing cost of health care in this country. In apparent recognition that
growing government subsidy of health care costs has been a major factor in driving up costs,
the 1974 legislation was drafted with a twofold purpose in mind:
(1) [To create] a single new program of State and areawide health planning and development which combines the best features of the existing programs; and
(2) [To minimize] uneconomic duplication of facilities and highly specialized services;
[to foster] cost control through improved efficiency and productivity, including promotion of cost effective preventive method health care services; and [to foster] more effective competition within the health system in order to improve consumer choices in the
organizing, financing and delivery of health services.
S. REP. No. 93-1285, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7842, 7843, 7853. See also, J. FREYMAN, THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: ITS
GENESIS AND TRAJECTORY 103 (1974).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c to -22 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
10. CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE EFFECT OF

PSROs

ON HEALTH CARE COSTS: CURRENT

FINDINGS AND FUTURE EVALUATIONS (background paper, 1979).
11. See generally F. SLOAN & B. STEINWALD, INSURANCE REGULATION AND HOSPITAL
COSTS (1980); Sloan & Steinwald, Effects oRegulationon Hospital Costs and Input Use, 23
J. L. & ECON. 81 (April, 1980).
12. F. SLOAN & B. STEINWALD, INSURANCE REGULATION AND HOSPITAL COSTS 99-100,
107 (1980).

13. See, e.g., F.

SLOAN, REGULATION OF THE RISING COSTS OF HOSPITAL CARE

(1980);

Biles, Schramm & Athinson, Hospital Cost Inflation Under State Rate-Setting Programs,303
NEW ENG. J. MED. 664 (1980); Coelen & Sullivan, An Analysis of the Effects of Prospective
Reimbursement Programs on Hospital Expenditures, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. I
(Winter, 1981).
14. See Coelen & Sullivan, supra note 13, at 1.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 41

Overall, a neutral observer would probably reach the conclusion
that our system of health care regulation has failed. Here, by "health
care regulation" I mean not only the new style programs but the entire
set of laws and legally shaped institutions that bear on the financing
and delivery of health services. Health care regulation in this broad
sense has failed in that it has neither restrained rapidly rising costs nor
insured an acceptable ratio of benefits to costs.
The question then arises: why has health care regulation failed?
Many analysts have proposed answers to this question, and the answers
tend to come in standard packages.' 5 Today I want to focus on one
part of a complete answer. It is a part that I believe has been missed,
underemphasized, or misconstrued in many analyses. My theme is this:
health care regulationfailsbecause as a society we do not know how to
impose optimal social controls on professionalpower,and our awareness
of this ignorance is so disturbingthat we have adopted no significant external controls on professionals at all.
Of course, numerous analysts have noted that physicians make
many of the key decisions in the medical world. Usually they find a
troublesome side to this decision making role, and usually they attribute it to physician expertise. This common analysis is correct, but incomplete. What I want to emphasize, and to illustrate extensively, is
the deference that our legal system pays to the judgments of the medical profession. I will then indicate the results of this deference, and
suggest some things that might be done about it. But before I do this, I
must issue a few caveats.
First, I am not trying to put forward a conspiracy theory, or even a
regulation-is-a-form-of-cartel argument. Nor do I want to suggest that
the legal system's deference to the medical profession has been clearly
reprehensible and that something else quite obviously ought to have
been done. My view is that the question of the proper stance of the law
toward professionals-any and all professionals-is a very deep and
difficult problem. Indeed, it is one of the major problems of modern
societies. The problem arises because it may not be wise for inexpert
lay persons to regulate the expert actions of professionals. If regulation
is done improperly, it may do more damage than simply letting the
professionals do what they want. While I do intend to offer some regulatory recommendations, I want to admit at the outset the difficulty of
the problem.
The second caveat is that analyses parallel to the one I shall give
15. See, e.g., A. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN (1980); M. FELDSTEIN, HOSPITAL COSTS
1-15 (1981).

AND HEALTH INSURANCE
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might very well be made in the cases of lawyers, accountants, business
managers, investment advisors, and other professionals. Indeed, a
plausible case can be made that the United States has failed to regulate
professional power generally, and therefore suffers from socially excessive amounts of professional services: too much litigation because
there are too many lawyers drumming up business among lay persons
who cannot accurately value the worth of legal advice; too much securities analysis (despite the many years' worth of "random walk" studies
that refute its worth to the average individual investor) 6 because there
are too many investment professionals who have convinced clients that
their work is esoteric expertise rather than mystical hocus pocus; and so
forth.
Excuse me for not elaborating all of this; I can tackle only one
problem at a time.
I.

THE DEPTH AND BREADTH OF LEGAL DEFERENCE TO THE
MEDICAL PROFESSION

There appear to be many laws regulating health care professionals.
In fact, most of them embody extreme deference to the medical profession. Consider a number of the more salient instances.
Malpracticelaw. The first is medical malpractice law. In an obvious sense, malpractice law is designed to control the conduct of practicing physicians, to make sure that it lives up to certain standards of
quality. But more significantly, in all but a tiny fraction of the reported
cases, the standard of care is "accepted medical practice" as defined by
the actual custom and practice of physicians.' 7 Thus a defendant physician will usually win if he can find other doctors to testify that he
followed customary medical practice.' 8 Even if he didn't follow customary practice, he may still prevail if he can obtain expert testimony
that his treatment was within the range of what a "reasonable and prudent physician" might do, 9 or, in some courts, what a "respectable minority" of physicians would do.2" Courts almost never impose a higher
standard on physicians than actual customary practice or, at most, the
prevailing notions of orthodox doctors as to what customary practice
ought to be. There are some exceptions. In Helling v. Carey,2' the court
16. See generally B. MALKIEL, A

RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET

(3d ed. 1980).

17. S. LAW & S. POLAN, PAIN AND PROFIT: THE POLITICS OF MALPRACTICE 7 (1978).
18. See, e.g., Lauro v. Travelers Ins. Co., 261 So. 2d 261 (La. Ct. App. 1972).
19. See, e.g., Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. 1977).

20. See, e.g., Leech v. Bralliar, 275 F. Supp. 897 (D. Ariz. 1967); Baldor v. Rogers, 81 So.
2d 658 (Fla. 1954).
21. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974) (en banc).
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did impose a higher, non-customary standard when it held ophthalmol-

ogists liable for failing to give a cheap and simple pressure test for
glaucoma to a young patient. It is a notorious case precisely because
the court did the unthinkable - for once, mere judges dared to place
their profane hands on the Ark of the Covenant. But the facts of the
case were special,22 other courts did not follow the decision,2 3 the state
legislature reacted against it,2 4 and commentators often condemned
it. 25 In short, it is the exception that proves the rule. Far more typical
is the attitude of the California Supreme Court in Landeros v. Flood,2 6

which considered whether a physician was responsible for knowing
about emerging diagnostic criteria, specifically, whether he should have
been able to recognize battered child syndrome. The court concluded
that there should be expert medical testimony on the issue - that is, in
effect, that the norm of practice should be determined by physicians
themselves.
A few informed consent cases, like Canterbury v. Spence,27 form
another exception to the rule that customary practice defines a doctor's
standard of care. They hold that a physician's duty to disclose is based
on the patient's need to know rather than on customary practice.28 But
the exception is an insubstantial one, because many courts have not
22. The glaucoma test was cheap, simple, effective, reliable, and free of adverse side
effects. When glaucoma is discovered, there are clearly effective ways of treating it. When
glaucoma goes undetected, it can lead to serious and irreversible damage to vision. The
probability of getting glaucoma at various ages is known with fair precision. Id. at 518, 519
P.2d at 983. In view of all these characteristics - which certainly are not all true of many
medical conditions - the court could view itself, not as assessing any particular medical
procedure or custom on its medical merits, but as performing an almost textbook-like costbenefit analysis of the sort recommended by modem commentators on tort law.
23. See S. LAW & S. PoLAN, supra note 17, at 117-18.
24. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.290 (Supp. 1981) (providing that, in order to
prevail in a malpractice suit, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the
defendant failed to exercise that degree of skill, care, and learning possessed by other persons in the same profession). But see Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979)
(en banc) (unrepentant court refuses to accept this view of statutory provision).
25. See, e.g., Altschule, Bad Law, Bad Medicine, 3 AM. J.L. & MED. 296 (Fall, 1977).
While this article does not mention the Helling case explicitly, Dr. Altschule contends that physicians are exposed to an excessively high risk of liability for malpractice and,
as a result, must substitute the use of "defensive", often unnecessary laboratory tests for
reliance on their own sound medical judgment. His "solution": "make evaluation of a physician's judgment and technical competence solely the duty of experts, and not of a jury of
laymen, of a judge, or of a lawyer who puts the intention of winning a case above every
other consideration." Id. at 297.
26. 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
27. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
28. This need to know is for information material to a treatment decision and the test for
determining whether a particular peril must be divulged is thus its materiality to the patient's decision. Id. at 786-87.

19811

WHY HEALTH REGULATION FAILS

7

followed this approach,2 9 legislatures have reacted against it,3" and
most malpractice cases simply do not raise the issue.3 1 Most important
of all, the informed consent cases do not entail judicial evaluation32of
the efficacy or cost-effectiveness of customary medical procedures.
Furthermore, in most malpractice cases accepted medical practice
has to be established by the oral testimony of expert physicians. The
court will not do its own survey and assessment of medical texts and
journals. Of course, there are occasions when proof of negligence does
not depend on expert testimony. For example, the physician may have
left a sponge or clamp inside the patient he operated on, and even a lay
person might conclude that this was improper. But the courts restrict
the range of these cases to a surprising degree. Often they force the
plaintiff to get expert testimony as to whether or not a clear mistake in
following a standard medical procedure, for example, putting a stitch
in a woman's kidney tube during a hysterectomy, should be considered
negligence. 33 To be sure, in cases alleging maladministration of drugs,
courts nowadays may allow the manufacturer's recommendations as to
proper usage to be substituted for expert testimony. 34 In view of the
substantial research on safety and efficacy that lies behind all such
manufacturer's recommendations, 35 to do otherwise would be patently
irrational. But even here the courts allow physicians to plead and
29. See generally Plant, The Decline of "Informed Consent," 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91
(1978).
30. See id. at 101. See also Meisel & Kobnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment.An Analysis ofRecent Legislation, 41 U. PiTT. L. REV. 407 (1980) (considers informed consent statutes in 24 states).
31. See S. LAW & S. POLAN, supra note 17, at 112-13.

32. Since almost any medical procedure entails some risk to health from the procedure
itself, a rational patient trying to decide whether to undergo a recommended procedure
would be quite interested in the procedure's true efficacy and, to the extent the patient is
uninsured, in its cost-effectiveness.
33. Hart v. Steele, 416 S.W.2d 927 (Mo. 1967).
34. See, e.g., Lhotka v. Larson, 307 Minn. 121, 238 N.W.2d 870 (1976); Mulder v. Parke
Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 181 N.W.2d 882 (1970); Mueller v. Mueller, 221 N.W.2d 39
(S.D. 1974).
35. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)-(e) (1976). Under this section of The Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, the introduction into commerce of any new drug (which is defined as one
not generally recognized by experts as effective and safe, 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (1976)) is
prohibited unless there is substantial evidence showing that the drug is safe and effective for
its intended use. "Substantial evidence" is defined as:
evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical
investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the
effectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly
be concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in
the labelling or proposed labelling thereof.
21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1976).
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prove excuses, based on their experts' testimony, for their particular
acts of deviance from manufacturer's instructions.3 6
In sum, the touchstone of malpractice cases is accepted medical
practice, as established by the testimony of individual medical experts,
and as defined in autonomous fashion by the medical profession itself.
The crucial significance of this state of affairs lies in what the law does
not provide. It does not provide for judicial evaluation of conventional
medical judgment with respect to diagnostic criteria and treatment procedures. More important - since judicial evaluation is not feasible the law does not even provide process controls on the profession's development of norms of practice. There is no requirement that a specified authoritative body, whether in the government or in the medical
profession, must have reviewed evidence of controlled clinical trials of
the efficacy, much less the cost-effectiveness, of a medical procedure
before it can be treated as acceptable medical practice. 37 There is an
analogous requirement with respect to drugs, of course: manufacturers
must obtain FDA approval before marketing new drugs, and that approval depends upon submission of fairly rigorous scientific proof of
the safety and efficacy of the drugs.3 8 And while many would criticize
the particular design of these procedures and the performance of the
FDA, I think most responsible persons would approve the basic idea.
Why is it that our society can bring itself to demand that drug
companies prove the efficacy of their pills but not to demand that the
medical profession prove the efficacy of surgical operations and other
standard procedures? Surely the answer is not the supposed inability of
a lay legislature to legislate Wise controls over matters requiring expertise. That explanation would suggest no regulation in either context.
The answer, I think, is simply that lay persons, including legislators, are
conditioned to exhibit deference and submission to physicians.
Physicianeducation. The second example of the legal system's deference to the discretion of the medical profession concerns the educa36. See, e.g., Lhotka v..Larson, 307 Minn. 121, 238 N.W.2d 870 (1976); Mulder v. Parke
Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 181 N.W.2d 882 (1970); Mueller v. Mueller, 221 N.W.2d 39

(S.D. 1974).
37. Note that process controls can be designed to leave room for medical researchers to
engage in true experimentation with untested procedures. But much current use of un-

proven processes is "experimental" only in the colloquial sense that the doctors are not sure
what will happen. This "let's try it out" approach of the individual clinician is a far cry from
executing a well-planned, well-designed, controlled experiment in which data about results

will be systematically collected and processed in light of a pre-formulated hypothesis. The
latter kind of experiment is far more likely to add to scientific knowledge and it deserves
more solicitude than the traditional freedom of the clinician to act on intuition and on experience with small samples of cases.
38. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1976).
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tion of doctors. After the famous Flexner report on medical education
in 1910,39 every state established standards for licensing doctors, either
by statute or by the rules of state medical licensing boards, with the
proviso that the boards consider only graduates of medical schools approved by the American Medical Association or the Association of
American Medical Colleges.4" Later, in 1942, the Council on Medical
Education of the AMA set up the Joint Liason Committee on Medical
Education to perform the accrediting function. The committee was to
be physician-dominated; its members were to include six representatives of the AMA, six representatives of the Association of American
Medical Colleges, two public representatives, and one representative of
the federal government. All states delegated power to approve medical
schools to this committee. 4 ' In essence, the system thus created has
continued to this day.
As commentators have noted, this delegation creates a conflict of
interest: "The decision with respect to what is adequate training and an
adequate number of doctors affects the pocketbooks of those who do
the regulating as well as their closest business associates. ' 4 2 With some
exceptions,43 economists and students of medical history attribute a
number of problems partly to AMA control of medical education-a
serious restriction for several decades in the supply of physicians, an
increase in the costs of physician services, overspecialization, and a serious gap between educational costs and tuition revenues, a gap that
4
has led to substantial government subsidies of medical education.
Moreover, many of the educational requirements of medical schools
have never been shown by any sort of systematic study to relate directly
to the quality of actual medical practice. 5 Once again, the law does
not provide for any significant outside evaluation of the profession's
own standards of accreditation, nor does it contemplate any process
39. A. FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, Bulletin No.
4 (1910).

40. See Note, The American MedicalAssociation: Power, Purposeand Politicsin Organized Medicine, 63 YALE L.J. 937, 969 (1954).
41. See Forgotson, Roemer & Newman, Licensure of Physicians, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q.

249, 269.
42. Kessel, PriceDiscriminationin Medicine, I J.L. & ECON. 20, 29 (October, 1958).
43. E.g., K. LEFFLER, EXPLANATION IN SEARCH OF FACTS: A CRITIQUE OF "A STUDY
OF PHYSICIANS' FEES" 15 (Coral Gables, Fla.: Law and Economics Center, University of
Miami School of Law, 1978); Spahr, Medicine's Neglected Control Lever, 40 YALE REV. 25
(Winter, 1951).

44. See J. GOODMAN, THE REGULATION OF MEDICAL CARE: IS THE PRICE Too HIGH?
46-47 (1980); Kissam, Physician'sAssistant and Nurse PractitionerLaws: .4Study of Health
Law Reform, 24 KAN. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1975).
45. J. GOODMAN, supra note 44, at 34.
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controls. There is no requirement that accreditation standards be justified by empirical studies. There is not even a requirement that accreditation standards conform to vague statutory principles or goals-for
example, that the benefits of accreditation standards in terms of improved quality of patient care must be found to outweigh their costs. In
the construction and regulation of medical curricula that are prerequisites to the lawful practice of medicine, there is virtually total deference
to the medical profession.
Medical licensure. The third example of the legal system's deference to professional autonomy lies in the medical practice acts. In gen46
eral, under these laws, only licensed physicians can practice medicine.
The licensing procedure is carried out by state medical licensing
boards. These boards are always made up solely or predominantly of
physicians, most of whom have been nominated or approved by state
medical societies .4 7 They base licensing decisions principally upon the
results of examinations that are prepared nationally by one or another
trade association group 4 and, as I indicated before, upon successful
completion of a course of study at a medical school approved by the
Joint Liaison Committee. After surviving this process, the new physician is given an almost unlimited right to practice medicine and de
facto lifetime tenure. The newly licensed physician with little training
in surgery can nevertheless perform it legally; the nurse who has skillfully assisted at many operations of a particular kind may not do them.
Requirements for license renewal and maintenance are weak and the
technical possibility of license revocation for conduct harmful to the
46. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 122(a) (1980) ("No person shall practice medicine in
this State unless he is licensed by the Board and is registered in accordance with the provisions of this subtitle..."). Section 123 also requires that an applicant be 18 years old, of
"good moral character," and a graduate of a medical school whose standards are equal to
those established by the Association of American Medical Colleges and the Council on
Medical Education of the AMA or of the American Osteopathic Association. Various exceptions are listed in § 122.
47. The number of members can vary from "five reputable physicians of known ability"
appointed by the Governor from a list submitted by the State Medical Society (plus one
member representing the public), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-6-1 (A) (Cum. Supp. 1980), to 12
physicians (plus one citizen) appointed by the governor from a list compiled by the State
Medical Association, GA. CODE ANN. § 84-902 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
Maryland's Board of Medical Examiners, officially established in MD. ANN. CODE
art. 43, § 120 (Supp. 1980), has ten members: eight to be currently practicing physicians,
licensed by the state and elected by the "Medical and Chirurgical Faculty of the State of
Maryland", plus two members of the general public appointed by the Governor.
48. For example, both Florida and Georgia require that their applicants be certified by
passing the Federation Licensing Examination (FLEX). Alternatively, Florida accepts certification by the National Board of Medical Examiners, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.313(d) (1981),
and Georgia, by any other National standardized examination which the board approves,
GA. CODE ANN. § 84-913 (1979).
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public or other specified reasons is rarely actualized, even in the case of
seriously impaired physicians.4 9 On the other hand, medical licensing
boards can be very active in litigation trying to exclude other persons
from attempting to do things that constitute or resemble medical practice. Can ear piercing be done by cosmeticians, or only by medical
doctors?5" May a corporation formed to operate a plasmaphoresis or
plasma collecting clinic, which uses a routinized and highly structured
set of procedures, legally allow its nurse employees to collect blood
from donors, or may this only be done by physicians? 5 May licensed
chiropractors draw blood samples to send to licensed laboratories for
testing, may they perform acupuncture and prescribe vitamins, or may
these activities only be done by physicians?5 2 May midwives legally
assist women in the delivery of their babies, or is childbirth a disease or
medical condition that can be supervised only by licensed medical doctors?53 All of these questions and many like them have been litigated
vigorously. In the aggregate, the cases indicate that the medical profession has been quite successful in preserving, extending, and monopolizing its turf.
More generally, the organized medical profession itself fills in the
content of the legal concept "practice of medicine" as it sees fit, and it
uses the state licensing system as a vehicle for excluding others from
the activities it puts into that concept. Whether this deference to professional autonomy is justified is a separate issue, of course. The orthodox view is that the licensing process is essential to upgrade the quality
of medical care and to protect the public from charlatans and quacks.
But no good empirical study has ever been made to verify the inference
that medical licensure in fact has led to an improvement in the quality
of care. A number of prominent economists have even argued quite
49. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, PuB. No. 73-78, REPORT OF
THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1973); New Treatmentfor Disabled Physicians." ProposedAmendments to the Medical PracticesAct of 1977, 42 ALB. L.
REV.

327, 329 (1978).

50. See Hicks v. Arkansas State Medical Bd., 260 Ark. 31, 537 S.W.2d 794 (1976)(Ar-

kansas State Medical Board failed in its attempt to have ear piercing classified as "the practice of medicine or surgery").
51. See Mirsa, Inc. v. State Medical Bd., 42 Ohio St. 2d 399, 329 N.E.2d 106
(1975)(Court held that blood collecting procedures constituted the "practice of medicine").
52. See State v. Wilson, 11 Wash. App. 916, 528 P.2d 279 (1974) (Court held that gal-

vanic acupuncture and the taking of blood samples constitute the practice of surgery and
may not be performed by chiropractors or drugless healers; that chiropractors may not give
or prescribe any substance for the purpose of treating disease; and that drugless healers may
prescribe only those nonpharmaceutical substances authorized by statute).
53. See Bowland v. Municipal Court, 18 Cal. 3d 479, 556 P.2d 1081, 134 Cal. Rptr. 630
(1978) (statute's prohibition against unlicensed persons treating a "physical condition"
found to encompass the practice of midwifery).
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seriously that licensure reduces the quality of care administered to patients.5 4 In addition, there are the more conventional critiques that
stress licensure's effects in raising the costs of medical education and of
health care and in aiding the growth in the numbers of allied health

personnel, like nurses, most of whom extend physician productivity
while being firmly subordinated to physicians.55
Nonphysician personnel. The laws pertaining to nonphysician

health care workers provide a fourth example of legal deference to doctors. The basic statutory pattern in every state is that the medical prac-

tice act defines the practice of medicine - that which only physicians

56
can legally do - in highly general, all-embracing, residual terms.
The licensing statutes for other kinds of health care workers, such as
dentists, optometrists, and nurses, then carve out strictly limited areas
of permissible practice. When there is an overlap of actual activities, as
where both physicians (plastic surgeons) and dentists (oral surgeons)
claim the right to do surgical repairs on fractured jaws, the courts seem
quick to interpret the statutes to allow the physicians to do the job,
even when the statutes appear to prohibit their doing it.57 With respect
to many nonphysician personnel who work in health care, such as

54. M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 155-60 (1962); F. SLOAN & R. FELDMAN,
Competition Among Physicians, in COMPETITION IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR: PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE 45 (W. Greenberg ed. 1978).
55. See generally Rayack, Restrictive Practices of Organized Medicine, 13 ANTITRUST
BULL. 659 (1968).
Because state licensing boards are largely controlled by the American Medical Association, "society has in effect given considerable power to organized medicine to restrict the
supply of physicians and to influence the patterns of medical care for the benefit of the
medical profession." Id. at 663-64. See also E. RAYACK, PROFESSIONAL POWER AND AMERICAN MEDICINE (1967).
56. The language in the Maryland statute defining "practice of medicine" is typical:
"Practice of medicine" means the exercise, whether for compensation or gratuitously, of
the art of science and medical diagnosis, healing or surgery and includes:
(1) Operating on, professing to heal, prescribing for or otherwise diagnosing or treating
any physical, mental or emotional ailment or supposed ailment of another.
(2) Undertaking by appliance, test, operation, or treatment to diagnose, prevent, cure,
heal, prescribe for, or treat any bodily, mental or emotional ailment or supposed ailment of another.
(3) Undertaking to treat, heal, cure or remove any physical, emotional or mental ailment or supposed ailment of another by mental, emotional or other process exercised or
invoked on the part of either the physician, the patient, or both.
(4) Assisting, attempting, inducing, or causing by any means whatsoever the termination of a human pregnancy.
(5) Performing acupuncture.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 119(f)(1)-(5)(1980).
57. See, e.g., Hill v. Highland Park Gen. Hosp., 80 Mich. App. 334, 263 N.W.2d 362
(1978)(Court did not find physicians liable for performing surgery statutorily restricted to
dentists by Dental Practice Act).
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nurses, the statutes firmly place doctors in charge of them.5 8
Perhaps the most interesting and illustrative examples of this last
point are given by the physician's assistant statutes. 59 During and after
the Viet Nam War, it struck observers that many military personnel
who had been trained as medical corpsmen and who were returning to
the states could sensibly be employed to provide good medical care to
civilians for a wide variety of fairly routine ailments. The concept of
using them as physician's assistants was born. Virtually all empirical
studies that examined the quality of care they render concluded that,
within the spheres of activity to which they were assigned, the quality
of care given by the PA's was as good as that provided by physicians.6 °
And yet PA's were far cheaper to train than doctors, and would do
their tasks for far less money. 6 '
58. In Maryland, for instance, the only medical duties that nurses may perform must be
delegated. Thus, they cannot practice medicine without such direction and supervision as
the physician desires. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 291(b)(2)(1980).
59. A representative physicians' assistant statute establishing the hierarchy between a
physician and his assistant is that of Arizona: "Services by a physicians' assistant shall be
rendered under the direction ofa Iicensedphysician or, when required by good medical practices, under the supervision of a licensedphysician."
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2507 (Cum. Supp. 1980)(emphasis added).
Other state physicians' assistant statutes containing similar "supervisory clauses"
are: ALASKA STAT. § 08.64.170(a)(1) (Supp. 1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-2001(B) (1979);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-36-106(3)(1)(1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., § 20-9 (West
Cum. Supp.198 1); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.347(3) (West 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-6203(c)
(1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 453-2 (1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 148C. 1(6) (West Cum.
Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2872(g) (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 9E
(West Cum. Supp. 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.17001(l)(d) (1978); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 71-1,107.16(4)(1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 630.015 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 329:21 XII (Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-6-6(B) (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9018(13)(b) (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-17-02(10) (1978); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 520
(West Cum. Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.065(b) (1979); S.C. CODE § 40-47-60(4)(b)
(1976); S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 36-4A-1 to -2 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-608 (1976);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-40 (1974); VA. CODE 54-281.4(b) (1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 18.71A.020(2)(1978); W. VA. CODE § 30-3-16(a)(l)-(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981); Wyo. STAT.
§ 33-26-118(a)(iv) (1977).

60.

CONG. BUDGET OFF., PHYSICIAN EXTENDERS: THEIR CURRENT AND FUTURE ROLE

IN MEDICAL CARE DELIVERY 11-12 (background paper, 1979), and studies cited therein;

Sox, Quality of Patient Care by Nurse Practitioners and Physicians' Assistants. A Ten Year
Perspective, 91 Ann. Int. Med. 459 (1979) (reviewing 27 quality-of-care studies). See also
Bessman, Comparisons of Medical Care in Nurse Clinician and Physician Clinics in Medical
School Affiliated Hospitals, 27 J. CHRONIC DISORDERS 115 (1974); Charles, Stimson,
Mausier & Good, Physician's Assistants and Clinical Algorithm in Health Care Delivery, 81
ANN. INT. MED. 733 (1974); Charney & Kitzman, The Child-Health Nurse (Pediatric Nurse
Practitioner) in Private Practice, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1353 (1971); Lewis, Resnick,
Schmidt & Waxman, Activities, Events and Outcomes in Ambulatory Patient Care, 280 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 645 (1969); Runyon, The Memphis Chronic Disease Program.- Comparisons in
Outcome and the Nurse's Extended Role, 231 J.A.M.A. 264 (1975).
61. CONG. BUDGET OFF., Physician Extenders. Their Current and Future Role in Medical
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From the medical profession's point of view, the financial implications of these findings were not clear. One could imagine at least three
scenarios. First, if PA's could operate independent practices within
their spheres of competence - subject, perhaps, to a duty to refer complex or doubtful cases to a physician6 2 - and if aggregate demand for
medical services was basically fixed by external forces, then PA's might
act as competitors of physicians. The competition would benefit consumers, but it might reduce physician incomes and opportunities. Second, if PA's were not independent but were employed and directed by
some physicians, and if aggregate demand for medical services is externally fixed, the PA's might extend the business-getting power and
net income of those physicians, albeit at the expense of other physicians. Third, if PA's were to be employed and directed by physicians,
but if physicians are able to induce demand for their services, 63 most
physicians might be able to extend their business and increase their
incomes by use of PA's. The result would simply be even more sharply
increasing health care costs - a loss to consumers, but a gain to
physicians.
Given the uncertainty as to which of these (or other) scenarios captured reality, one might have expected the reaction of the organized
medical profession to PA's to be somewhat erratic, even schizophrenic,
Ultimately, though, the AMA settled for resolutions
and it was.'
favoring regulatory statutes that would insure strong and multifaceted
physician control over PA's 65 - statutes that would reduce the likelihood that scenarios one or two would be realized. These resolutions
strongly influenced legislation. Philip Kissam, author of a meticulously
documented analysis of the state laws on physician's assistants and
nurse practitioners, concluded convincingly that most of the statutes
Care Delivery 26-29 (1979)(training costs of more than $60,000 per medical student - excluding college, internship, and residency training - as against $11,900 for PA). Also, the
per hour compensation of physicians is about four times greater than that of PA's. Id. at 14,
16.

62. Cf. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE, §§ 2505-2515 (Supp. 1981) (certificate to practice midwifery authorizes holder to attend cases of normal childbirth but imposes duty to summon a
physician when specified conditions arise).
63. See A.

ENTHOVEN,

AND HEALTH INSURANCE

HEALTH PLAN 27-28 (1980); M.
67-69, 80-88 (1981).

FELDSTEIN, HOSPITAL COSTS

64. J. GOODMAN, THE REGULATION OF MEDICAL CARE: Is THE PRICE Too HIGH? 46-47
(1980).
65. AMA HOUSE OF DELEGATES, EMPLOYMENT OF PHYSICIANS' ASSISTANTS (June,

1972); AMA BOARD OF TRUSTEES, REPORT 2, GUIDELINES FOR COMPENSATING PHYSICIANS FOR SERVICES OF PHYSICIANS' ASSISTANTS (approved by the AMA House of Delegates, June, 1972). See Kissam, Physician'sAssistant andNurse PractitionerLaws. A Study of
Health Care Reform, 24 KAN. L. REV. 1, 45-46 (1975).

1981]

WHY HEALTH REGULATION FAILS

15

were unduly restrictive in numerous ways.6 6 Many of them forbid independent practice entirely or limit it to a very narrow range of situations.6 7 They frequently forbid hospitals and other institutional
providers of care to hire and supervise PA's and nurse practitioners,
even when the institution would regulate their activities according to
detailed and carefully constructed protocols.6" Although PA's are permitted to practice under the direct command and control of a particular
physician, the statutes often limit the number of PA's a physician can
have (to one or two, for example); 69 they forbid the physician to delegate or limit his ability to delegate diagnostic and treatment functions
to PA's, no matter how well specified or routine;7 ° and they sometimes
forbid delegation of authority to prescribe drugs, no matter what the
context.7 In short, they limit the ability of individual physicians to use
PA's as means of taking away businessfrom otherphysicians (although
they allow doctors to use PA's to do their dirty work and to induce
greater aggregate demand for medical services). This tendency of the
laws is usually reinforced by other regulatory requirements: PA's must
be licensed, and the licensing function is given to the physician-controlled state medical licensing boards.7 2 Associations of PA's, who also
66. Kissam, supra note 65, at 65 (conclusions); see id. at 29-59 (supporting analysis).
Kissam notes that there are 38 PA statutes operating in 37 states of which 33 are termed by
him as "PA Regulatory Statutes," or statutes which "provide explicitly for some form of
administrative control over expanded medical delegation." Id. at 21 (Maryland's PA statute
is listed in this category). The remaining five statutes are termed "PA Simple Authorization
Statutes," or statutes which "consist merely of specific exemptions to state medical practice
acts for services rendered by nonphysicians who work under a physician's 'supervision' or
'direction and control.'" Id. at 24 (footnotes omitted). Kissam concludes that, when carefully drafted, the Simple Authorization format provides a more effective model for the regulation of PA's and NP's (nurse practitioners). He notes that the formal training required by
most regulatory statutes is lengthy and unnecessary because a supervising physician can
often "supply the comprehensive knowledge that the nonphysician lacks." Id. at 39.
67. See note 59 supra; see also Kissam, supra note 65, at 21 (PA laws that authorize only
physician-supervised practice do not allow independent practice by PA's).
68. See Kissam, supra note 65, at 55.
69. See id. at 57-58. See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-2014 (1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-

6204(e) (1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 148C.3 (Cum. Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 652896(g) (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 9E (West Cum. Supp. 1981); NEB. REV.

STAT. § 71-1,107.20(3) (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 630.273 (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-6-9
(1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-18(13)(a) (1981); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 36-4A-19.1 (Supp.
1980); VA. CODE § 54-281.5 (1978); W. VA. CODE § 30-3-160) (Cum. Supp. 1981); Wyo.
STAT. § 33-26-120(b)(1977).
70. See Kissam, supra note 65, at 5 (concluding that "physical examinations, medical
histories, diagnosis and treatment of common illnesses, minor surgery, and decisions to continue or modify prescribed treatment for convalescing or chronically ill patients generally
have not been delegated").
71. See id. at 50-51. An example is the Virginia PA statute which forbids "delegated
acts [including] the prescribing or dispensing of drugs." VA. CODE § 54-281.4(a) (1978).
72. II A HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, LICENSURE, Tab 5 (P. Lasky ed. 1981).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 41

seek some of the attributes of professional status, have compounded the
restrictions by lobbying for formal educational requirements that will
increase the cost of training and the future incomes of PA's but which,
according to the empirical studies of PA's performance, are not necessary to their effectiveness.7 3
A very similar, though somewhat different, story can be told and
documented about the regulatory statutes affecting nurse
practitioners.74
Why is it necessary for physicians to direct and control virtually all
of the activities of physician's assistants and nurse practitioners? And
why is it necessary for the organized medical profession, through medical licensing boards, to control the ability of individual physicians to
compete against one another by employing PA's or nurse practitioners
and delegating many tasks to them? The entire justification for these
restrictions rests on the supposed assurances of quality medical care
that these physician-manipulated controls will generate. Legislators
have apparently bought this argument. And yet there is no good systematic empirical evidence that the physician-held controls are neces76
sary to ensure quality. 75 The studies we do have suggest they are not.
Why then was the quality assurance argument accepted? The answer is
that in our society lay persons, including legislators, emit deference to
physicians almost as a reflex response. Deferential behavior, and the
associated suspension of critical judgment, comes as quickly as sneezing in the presence of pepper.
Relationshipsbetween physicians and hospitals. A fifth example of
73. When physician's assistants were first introduced, there was some concern that these
individuals having relatively brief clinical training (PA's normally complete a minimum of
two years of special training in basic primary medical care) would not be able to provide
good quality patient care, even when closely supervised by physicians. See, e.g., Miles, Physician'sAssistants." The Evidence Is Not In, 290 NEW ENG. J. MED. 251 (1974). However,
Dr. Sox's review of 21 controlled studies indicates that the quality of primary ambulatory
care, i.e., initial care of patients not confined to bed, given by the physician's assistants was
indistinguishable from that given by physicians. See Sox, supra note 60. See also Cherkin,
Factors Influencing the Physician Market for Primary Care New Health Practitioners, 18
MED. CARE 1097 (1980) (increased utilization of PA's has the potential to increase the efficiency of the health care system by ensuring that expensive inputs (physician time) are not
used to provide outputs (medical services) that could be equally well provided by less expensive inputs (PA time)).
74. Kissam, supra note 65, at 29-59, 65.
75. See Sox, supra note 60. (None of the studies in question analyzed solo care separately from care in which a physician provided consultation).
76. See, e.g, Newkirk, Rural Emergency Department Coverage, 71 J. ME. MED. A. 375
(1980). In this study PA's were used in the emergency department without on-site supervision. Diagnostic algorithms and a list of treatment protocols were used in lieu of direct
supervision. In the 564 cases studied, PA's made no significant diagnostic or treatment
errors.
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deference to professional self-regulation appears in hospitals. According to the standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals and an occasional state statute, 77 medical staff by-laws should
leave all "medical matters," whatever that might mean, in the hands of
the medical staff rather than in the hands of the hospital's board of
trustees. There is obviously a severe problem in trying to draw a
proper line between matters appropriate for the business and managerial decision making authority of trustees and the professional medical
judgment of the physicians. The decision to build or not to build a
heart transplant unit obviously belongs to the trustees; the diagnosis of
a particular patient belongs to his physician. But there is a wide variety
of intermediate matters, such as whether the hospital trustees can impose, over the objection of the medical staff or of a particular physician,
a flat rule that all patients with myocardial infarction will be sent home
after one week in the hospital, absent the presence of certain clearly
specified circumstances. (Such a rule would be based on published empirical studies indicating that a longer stay does not correlate with improved prospects. 78 ) Theoretically, these intermediate issues are quite
problematic and ought to lead to extensive litigation and rule making.
In fact, it is common knowledge that most such issues are negotiated
peacefully, with the trustees generally deferring to the judgrient of the
medical staff.
Another facet of the hospital-physician relationship concerns admitting privileges. The considerable case law in this area 79 demonstrates that established groups of professionals can decide who comes
into their club, subject to no significant controls by hospital trustees or
courts. Trustees routinely defer to the medical staff's decision whether
to grant or renew admitting privileges to a particular physician. Courts
also exhibit almost total deference to the institution's judgments about
those matters, although in some contexts they impose due process re-

77.

JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL
103 (1981); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2392.5(c) (West 1974) (California

FOR HOSPITALS

code provision requiring that a hospital medical staff be self-governing with respect to the
professional work performed in the hospital).
78. See, e.g., Hutter, Sidel, Shine, & DeSanctis, Early HospitalDischargeAfter Myocar-

dial Infarction, 288 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1141 (1973) (for a patient with an uncomplicated
myocardial infarction "there appears to be no additional benefit" from a t'ire-week as compared to a two-week hospital stay); McNeer, Wagner, Ginsburg, Wallace, McCantis, Conley, & Rosati, Hospital Discharge One Week After Acute MyocardialInfarction, 298 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 229 (1978) (found that it was feasible and ethically justifiable to discharge
uncomplicated patients at one week after an acute myocardial infarction).
79. See II A HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, MEDICAL STAFF, Tabs 2, 3, 5. (P. Lasky ed.
1981).
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quirements such as notice and a right to be heard." Rarely are the
stall's bases of decison struck down,"' and in any event the range of
permissible criteria of decision are broad enough to permit all manner
of things to go on under cover of vagueness. Since the due process
attacks on staff decisions have proven unsatisfying, disappointed physicians have recently begun to attack staff decisions on antitrust
grounds.8 2 But preliminary results from this wave of cases, which include holdings that the federal antitrust laws are inapplicable because
staff decisions have no impact on interstate commerce,8 3 suggest that
plaintiffs will fare no better than in the past. The deference by trustees
and courts (and by legislators) persists even though, as a judge now and
then points out,8 4 key members of the existing medical staff may reject
an applicant because they regard him as a potential competitor, because they consider him racially, ethnically, or socially unacceptable, or
because they disapprove of his unorthodox attitudes. Thus an applicant might be rejected because he believes in health maintenance organizations or prefers to emphasize primary care and preventive
medicine. The lay persons following the rule of deference must have
assumed that all actions tainted by such conflicts of interest or improper motives must be greatly overwhelmed by the decisions on admitting privileges that reflect only the staff's decision to maximize the
public interest. Such an assumption requires a considerable act of
faith.
Economic autonomy. A sixth case of deference - a whole complex
of examples, actually - consists of the many rules and practices granting physicians economic autonomy - the right to determine unilaterally, rather than in a serious bargaining session or in an informed
competitive market, how much they ought to be paid. Physicians in
our country generally work on a fee-for-service basis. Moreover, even
though hospital rates and revenues are being increasingly subjected to
severe regulation,8 5 physician fees are not subject to any significant re80. See, e.g., Silver v. Castle Mem. Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475, 497 P.2d 564 (1972) (due
process requirements imposed).
81. See, e.g., Guerrero v. Burlington County Mem. Hosp., 70 N.J. 344, 360 A.2d 334
(1976)(deference to trustees' reasoning and decision).
82. E.g., Capili v. Shott, [1980, Vol. 2] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)

63,299 (4th Cir.

1980); Moles v. Morton F. Plant Hosp., [1980-19811 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
(M.D. Fla. 1980).

83. Capili v. Shott, [1980, Vol. 2] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)

63,600

63,299 (4th Cir. 1980);

Moles v. Morton F. Plant Hosp., [1980-1981] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 63,600 (M.D. Fla.
1980).
84. See Silver v. Castle Mem. Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475, 488, 497 P.2d 564, 573 (1972)(Abe,
J.,concurring).
85. See Coelen & Sullivan, supra note 14.
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strictions. The prototypical third party reimbursement formula refers
to usual, customary and reasonable physician fees,86 which is code language for saying that (a) only a physician whose fees are wildly out of
line with those of his peers will be questioned by third party payors, but
(b) the physicians as a group may steadily move their average fees upward, as they see fit. Similarly, the use by payors of specific fee schedules usually reflects practice rather than shapes it. Despite the fee-forservice custom and the virtual nonregulation of the amount of fees,
insurers and governmental programs generally accede to reimbursement of physician charges. The result, predictably, is continuing inflation in physician fees and incomes.
Moreover, there is very little outside evaluation and control over
the "services" part of the fee-for-service system. The situation is reminiscent of malpractice standards: third parties do not independently
evaluate the appropriateness of classes of medical procedures that are
considered for inclusion in their health plans. Nor are there any significant process controls. Insurers do not routinely require, for example,
that before a given type of surgery will be eligible for reimbursement
under their plans, some authoritative national organization must have
found, from examining empirical evidence, that the kind of surgery in
question is (a) efficacious and/or (b) cost-effective. Basically, third
party payors simply accept whatever happens to be customary practice
as it has evolved through the cumulative decisions of the members of
the medical profession. There are some heartening exceptions, such as
the Blue Cross/Blue Shield "medical necessity" program, 87 but they
represent, as of now, a minor factor in the health care system. For the
most part, potential conflicts of interest - physicians' incentives to
favor those plausible, but not rigorously tested, procedures that happen
to maximize their own income or sense of craft or other kind of utility
- are simply ignored.
To drive home the point about the deference to professional discretion on the part of third party payors, I will quote the first section of
the Medicare statute8 8 as it has been codified. You might think that the
lead-off section of this historically momentous federal statute, which
along with Medicaid caused a virtual sea change in the American

86. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 13951 (1976) (Medicare reimbursement formula).
87. In May, 1977, the Board of Governors of the Blue Cross/Blue Shield Association

approved a resolution for a nationwide program of "medical necessities." This program was
instituted to contain medical costs by requiring physician justification for the use of certain
procedures. Telephone interview with J.S. Nagelschmidt, Director of Public Information,
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Associations, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 14, 1981).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1976).
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health care system, would say something about the great importance of
providing equal access to effective medical care for the nation's older
citizens. But it does not. It is entitled "Prohibition against any federal
interference," and it reads,
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize any
Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or control
over the practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided, or over the selection, tenure, or compensation of
any officer or any employee of any institution, agency, or person
providing health services; or to exercise any supervision or control
over the administration or operation of any such institution,
agency, or person.89
That certainly puts the federal government in its place!
The second section of the Medicare statute sets forth the principle
that Medicare beneficiaries should have a guaranteed "free choice"
among physicians. 9° This is code language for saying that the federal
government should not urge physicians to join closed panel health
plans9 ' that might control program costs but reduce physician incomes.
It is quite plausible, of course, to suppose that people prefer to choose
their personal physicians. But it is doubtful that taxpayers value such
choice so highly that they welcome the extraordinary cost of absolutely
free choice-that is, that they have given informed consent to government programs that assure each beneficiary of the ability to choose any
one among the thousands of doctors in a large city rather than any one
of the fifty or one hundred doctors in a reputable prepaid group practice that he voluntarily joined. I doubt that the extreme value placed
by the statute on "free choice" is supported by good evidence of taxpayer preferences. Once again, the law simply reflects uncritical deference to what the medical profession thinks is the proper way to
structure its own business arrangements.
89. Id.

90. 42 U.S.C. § 1395a (1976).
91. A closed panel plan is one in which subscribers who wish to have health services

covered by the plan must obtain them, subject to certain exceptions (e.g., for emergencies
and when certain specialists are needed), from a defined group of physicians with whom the
plan administrators have contracted. Usually determined in advance is their method and
rate of payment for giving services to plan subscribers. The number of doctors in the panel
may be relatively small or large, for restricted size is not the key to the concept. "It is a key
feature of such plans that" the doctors will have restricted their freedom to bill for services

as they please.
Prepaid health plans, like health maintenance organizations, are often organized on
a closed panel basis. In a sense, any provider agreement between an insurance company and
signing physicians that makes these physicians more likely to be chosen by the insured parties is a closed panel plan.
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Physicians'freedomfrom regulation. My seventh and final set of
examples concerns the medical profession's surprising freedom from
the massive waves of "new style" health care regulation that inundated
our health care system throughout the 1970's. Consider the three major
sets of regulatory controls: utilization review, certificate of need programs, and rate setting laws. The 1972 federal law establishing hundreds of Professional Standards Review Organizations 92 in the United
States directed them to review and evaluate all hospitalization decisions that would lead to payments under the Medicare and Medicaid
programs. So stated, the law sounds as if it intrudes significantly into
professional discretion. But the process turns out to be nothing more
than local peer review that is basically undefined and unregulated by
external authorities. By statute, PSRO's must consist solely of licensed
93
physicians practicing in the area where the PSRO does its work.
Moreover, a PSRO may delegate its reviewing functions to a committee
in each hospital in its area, under certain conditions,94 and the great
majority of hospitals have taken advantage of this. 95 As for the standards of review, the statute says that the reviewers must make sure that
the proposed institutional care (a) is "medically necessary," (b) satisfies
professional standards of quality, and that (c) a cheaper but equally
good alternative such as ambulatory care or in-hospital care of another
sort is not feasible.96 To say the least, these standards permit of generous interpretation. (Is it "medically necessary" for a terminally ill cancer patient whose life may be prolonged for a few more weeks by
extremely expensive therapeutic measures to undergo such measures?)
Overall, the PSRO law is like putting a bunch of fat little boys in
charge of a bottomless cookie jar, and telling them, "Don't let any one
of yourselves eat a cookie unless the rest of you think that it's appropriate and that the cookie is up to your professional standards of good
taste. (If necessary,' Big Mommy will make sure that good quality
cookies, however expensive, are put into the jar.)"
Federal law9 7 has made it practically necessary for almost all
states9" to adopt certificate of need programs under which institutional
health care providers must seek agency permission before they can
92.
93.
94.
95.

42 U.S.C. § 1320c (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4(a)(5) (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4(e) (1976).
Status Report on ProfessionalStandardsReview Organizations, 43 CONN. MED. 733

(1979). This report states that, as of 1979, at least 70% of the review functions of PSRO's
had been delegated.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).

97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300m, 300m-6 (Supp. III 1979).
98. Arizona is the hold-out. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-830 (1975).
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make major capital expenditures. In general, these entry controls do
not apply to the purchasing decisions of individual physicians and
groups of physicians, regardless of how significant their expenditures
might be.99 Finally, states have increasingly adopted rate setting laws
applicable to hospitals and other institutional health care providers,
and they have tended to make these laws stricter over time.1°° But in
general, they have not yet moved significantly against the fees and revenues of physicians.
Both hospitals and doctors in the United States operated in a bizarre, wildly inflationary world of third party reimbursements applied
to a fee-for-service system of pricing. Yet only the capital expenditure
and pricing decisions of the hospitals were subjected to public utilitytype regulation. Why this difference? Could it be that lawmakers have
determined, independently upon examination of relevant empirical evidence, that doctors are much better able to resist the conflict of interest
inherent in a fee-for-service system' 0 than hospitals? One certainly
doubts this, especially because most hospital costs, both in the utilization and in the capital-building context, are the result of decisions by
doctors. The most plausible explanation is that lawmakers are simply
afraid to regulate physicians.
Let me sum up this part of the analysis. The question is whether
physicians as a group determine their own norms of practice exclusively - whether they and they alone determine what they do as doctors, how they do it, how they should be paid for it, and how much or whether the norms of conduct governing them are created or at least
evaluated by other groups of people or, failing that, whether the physicians' norm-makingprocessis somehow subjected to control and structuring by other groups. My analysis suggests that the medical
profession enjoys enormous autonomy. Its determination of its own
work is not significantly controlled by patients, acting as medical care
99. The New Jersey statute is typical, applying such controls only to health care facilities, not to physicians:
No health care facility shall be constructed or expanded, and no new health care services shall be instituted after the effective date of this act except upon application for and
receipt of a certificate of need as provided by this act.
26 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2H-7 (West Supp. 1981-1982).
100. See Coelen & Sullivan, supra note 14.
101. Since the provider of medical services on a fee-for-service basis (a) often has some
power or influence over the patient's decision to purchase services (because of the patient's
inferior position of medical knowledge) and (b) has an incentive to provide ever more services (because more services mean more income), the provider experiences a continual temptation to recommend and provide services that may be excessive, unnecessary, or even
harmful to the patient. There is, therefore, a pervasive conflict between the patient's and the
provider's interest.
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purchasers in something like a competitive market; nor by judges, in
hearing malpractice cases; nor by the states, in their licensing laws; nor
by hospital managers, in their institutional decision making; nor by
other health care workers, through their competition; nor by insurers
and governmental programs, through their reimbursement practices;
nor by the modern health regulatory agencies, through their programs
of utilization review, certificates of need, or rate setting. In very large
part, the medical profession gives the law to itself, and all others defer.
II.

RESULTS

The key result of the system of widespread deference to professional power has been a socially excessive consumption of medical
services. The system is characterized by realized conflicts of interest
and mysticism about the value of customary medical practice. Physicians, having been given the incentives to do so, recommend and produce costly services that are only marginally valuable; and, since they
are subject to strong financial incentives but little external criticism
about matters within their areas of expertise, they are able, without any
conscious deception or subjective bad faith, to convince themselves and

lay persons of the value of clinical practices that are not really proven.
Professional power that is not externally regulated may be tolerable in some contexts. Perhaps the so-called "academic freedom" of college professors is an example. (More likely, such freedom is simply
overvalued by interested parties like myself!) But in the medical sector
professional autonomy operates in a huge part of the economy that is
flawed in many ways. Consumers and insurers are unable to second
guess conventional medical judgment in particular cases; society is ignorant of the true value of medical practices in general; insurance is
widespread and generates moral hazards;10 2 massive government subsidies drastically alter private decision making; and the populace, often
alienated from older sources of comfort like the church and the family,
has developed a blind faith in salvation through medical care. These
conditions are like the debris on a forest floor, and are themselves
enough to support a spontaneous combustion; unhampered professional autonomy is like the wind that blows it into a raging fire.
102. "Moral hazards" refers to the tendency of a person who is covered by an insurance
policy to incur greater risks and to run up the cost of compensating for realized risks precisely because he is covered by insurance and will not bear these costs himself. It does not
refer only to policyholders who commit immoral acts like burning their insured homes, but
also, and more frequently, to careless behavior such as taking a damaged and insured automobile to a very expensive repair shop. See Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital
Industry?, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1416, 1424 (1980).
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WHAT CAN BE DONE?

The key problem, of course, is how - or whether - inexpert lay
persons can control expert professionals without making things even
worse than they are in a system of virtually complete professional autonomy. I will present again three reform suggestions that have long
been in the air, in the hope that in the aftermath of my analysis they
will take on new meaning and force. I will also propose a new look at
two other paths of reform.
First, the laws relating to health care delivery and payment should
be altered to change the economic incentives presented to doctors. The
propriety of different kinds of economic incentives is not a subject
about which the medical profession has special expertise. Courts might
change their incentives by methods as conservative as employing antitrust principles to break down conditions that inhibit insurance companies from effectuating cost-conscious innovations in their plans and
practices. This is one of the moves that Professor Clark Havighurst has3
10
in mind when he advocates unleashing the forces of competition.
Economic incentives might also be changed by strategies as innovative
as adopting a national health plan that favors health maintenance organizations in the manner of Alain Enthoven's well-known Consumer
Choice Health Plan."° I strongly endorse efforts of this sort. After
studying the depth of the legalization of deference to the medical profession, however, I feel constrained to express the suspicion that reforms of this sort are not enough. I doubt whether the problems of our
health care system can be fully appreciated solely within the categories
of economic analysis. Deference to professional power is a profound
and basic fact of our society, and it must also be examined in psycho103. See Havighurst, ProfessionalRestraintson Innovation in Health CareFinancing,1978
DUKE L.J. 303, 343-73; cf. Havighurst, Health PlanningforDeregulation. Implementing the
1979 Amendments, 44 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 33 (Winter, 1981) (urging regulators to adopt

competition-enhancing interpretation of amendments to federal health planning law).
104. See A. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN (1980).

The primary elements of Enthoven's Consumer Choice Health Plan are:
1. Universal health insurance independent of job status.
2. Public funds used equitably so that subsidies to people for health insurance would
be based on the average cost of premiums in their medical risk categories.
3. Reform of the health care delivery system through incentives (competing organized
systems).
4. Positive program on the part of the government to make the market work.
5. Design based on principles that have actually been applied successfully (competition, multiple choice, private underwriting and management of health plans, periodic
government-supervised open enrollment, and equal rates for all similar enrollees selecting the same plan and benefits).
Id. at 115-19.
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logical, social, and political terms. And the fact of deference must be
dealt with not only by changing monetary inducements, but also by
changing personal attitudes and structures of power and authority.
Second, the law should seek to create greater lay control of health
care institutions and health care regulatory agencies. Such changes
could make a measurable difference. For example, recent empirical
work suggests that reimbursement levels are substantially lower when
physicians are not in control of the boards of Blue Shield plans. 0 5
Third, the federal government should sponsor or facilitate efforts
to provide health education for consumers - to restore or create a
greater measure of enlightened self-care, and a better appreciation of
the true advantages and the true limits of modem medicine.
Fourth, legislators ought to reexamine and reduce some aspects of
the legal system's deference to professional power. In particular, they
should support major studies of ways to reform and liberalize, if not
abolish, health licensing laws. Because the medical practice acts and
laws relating to nonphysician health personnel are state laws, and because substantial features of them have been static for many decades,
they tend to be ignored at the national policymaking level - .even
when broad reforms like national health insurance are being assessed.
This situation is understandable, but most unfortunate. Because of
custom and our natural (but flawed) human psychology, 0 6 many
lawmakers and commentators focus, as journalists do, only on recent
changes in the environment. They systematically ignore or slight the
importance of long-existing structures in shaping the effects of new developments. Academics should help redress this imbalance.
Fifth, and finally, I think that the federal government ought to regulate norms of medical practice. In the first phase of this effort, it
should gradually restrict reimbursement under governmental subsidy
programs to medical procedures or "technologies" that have been formally determined to be (a) effective in producing the results intended
and (b) worth their cost, as determined in a formal cost-benefit

analysis. 107
In the past few years, support for greater and more systematic ef105. Sloan, Physicians and Blue Shield- A Study of Effects of Physician Control on Blue
Shield Reimbursements, in ISSUES IN PHYSICIAN REIMBURSEMENT (N. Greenspan ed.

1981)(published by the Health Care Financing Administration as part of the Health Care
Financing Conference Proceedings).

106. For a good discussion of the nature and causes of chronic flaws in the layman's
attempts to act as intuitive scientist, see R. NISBE'rT & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE (1980).
107. See, e.g., Pliskin & Taylor, General Principles: Cost-Beneft and Decision Analysis, in
COSTS, RISKS AND BENEFITS OF SURGERY

5 (J. Bunker, A. Barnes & F. Mosteller eds. 1977).
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forts to evaluate medical practices has increased. 0 8 With the creation
of the National Center for Health Care Technology in late 1978,109
Congress took a step in the right direction. Among other things, the
Center was to support (by grant and contract) assessments of health
care technologies that take into account their safety, effectiveness, costeffectiveness, and their social, ethical and economic impact. The concept of "health care technology" was defined very broadly, and would
include most things falling under less trendy labels like "medical practices" and "procedures". The Center could make, and has made, recommendations to the Secretary of Health and Human Services
(specifically, for the Health Care Financing Administration) on proper
reimbursement policy. One recent study of four of the nonreimbursement recommendations estimates that they will have significant impact
on health care costs. l10
But existing programs are in an incipient stage, and are far from
perfect. Considering the magnitude of its tasks, the Center was severely underfunded l"' - and recently was simply given zero funding. Moreover, there is generally no requirement by the government
or other payors that providers supply data vital to the evaluation effort,
nor is there even a good system for making sure that national norms of
practice are being implemented in different regions of the country.
Moreover, the Center's role is to recommend, not to make binding decisions, and its positive duties are not well specified.
In my view the federal government should restructure and greatly
augment its attempts to regulate the practice of medicine. I lack the
time to mention, much less discuss, the many issues of design and implementation that ought to be addressed. I will only suggest that two
basic principles ought to guide the endeavor: the use of process controls and the use of countervailing professional power. My first principle suggests that the federal government might set up an independent
regulatory commission - call it the Commission on Medical Technol108. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, EvaluatingMedical Technologies in Clinical Use
(Conference Summary; January, 1981); Fineberg & Hiatt, Evaluation of Medical Practices.The Casefor Technology Assessment, 301 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1086 (1979); Relnan, Assessment of Medical Practices."A Simple Proposal, 303 NEw ENG. J. MED. 153 (1980).
109. 42 U.S.C. 242n(f)(l) (Supp. III 1979).
110. CENTER FOR THE ANALYSIS OF HEALTH PRACTICES, HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC
HEALTH, IMPACT ON HEALTH COSTS OF NCHT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NONREIMBURSEMENT OF MEDICAL PROCEDURES (1981) (revised report submitted to National Center for
Health Care Technology).
111. For the fiscal year ending September 30, 1981, $33 million were appropriated to
fund the Center. 42 U.S.C. § 242n(i)(Supp. 1979). Dr. Relman states that $100 million in
funding would be necessary for the center to begin "a proper" program for the support of
technology assessment. Reiman, supra note 108, at 154.
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ogies - whose full time commissioners would have the duty to evaluate both new and old common medical procedures in order to make
binding, albeit alterable, decisions about their efficacy and their costbenefit rationality. The statute would direct the commissioners to consider certain specified, economically significant procedures by a particular date. They would be bound each year to draw up a list of other
economically significant procedures that have not yet been evaluated
- a kind of "ten most wanted" list - and to evaluate them as soon as
feasible. They would also be bound to render evaluation decisions
upon request by third party payors (both public and private), providers
(including groups such as medical societies), and consumer groups.
They would approve or disapprove the procedures for reimbursement
under government health care plans, and they might specify conditions
of reimbursement, doing the best they could on the basis of available
evidence. Failure to find affirmative, methodologically valid empirical
evidence (for example, controlled clinical trials) of the efficacy of a procedure, whether in the published literature or in the reports supplied by
interested private parties, would result in nonapproval, pending possible future receipt of acceptable evidence, and with exceptions for well
designed experimental programs. If the clinical efficacy of a medical
procedure were established, the procedure would then be subjected to a
formalized cost-benefit analysis of the sort done by academic public
policy analysts. All relevant assumptions would have to be specified
and, where possible, supported by evidence.
The principle of using countervailing professional power is based
on the notion that one can sometimes fight fire with fire. If it is dangerous to let lay persons regulate professionals, then we might try to arrange things so that different kinds of professionals impose crosschecks on each other. In particular, the members of the Commission on
Medical Technologies should consist predominantly of nonphysicians
who nevertheless have relevant professional expertise - Ph.D. training
or its equivalent, and eminence in their profession. Thus, the commission members might include biochemists, biostatisticians and epidemiologists, economists, and public policy analysts. A minority of its
members would be physicians who are not also practicing medicine
and who are not members of any medical association or society.
(Something akin to this suggestion appears in the statutory description
of the composition of the National Council on Health Care Technology, but the guiding principle there appears to have been interest-group
representation more than deliberate use of countervailing professional
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power.)'" 2 None of the members of the commission would be able to
have any financial interests in any kinds of health care providers or
suppliers of medical goods and services. All would be appointed for
long terms.
Once established, the decisions of the Commission on Medical
Technologies could be put to many uses besides reforming the reimbursement practices of governmental health insurance programs. The
state courts could be urged to consider determinations of efficacy or
inefficacy in malpractice cases. Hospital boards of trustees could be
given explicit authority and encouragement to take commission approval or nonapproval of procedures into account when laying down
rules as to what kinds of procedures could or could not be followed
within their hospitals, or as to what kinds of practitioners could be admitted to their hospitals' staffs. Licensing agencies might periodically
test physicians to determine their familiarity with the decisions of the
commission. Licensing agencies might consider licensing nonphysician
personnel to perform selected approved procedures that they had found
such personnel were trained to do.
To evaluate my proposal critically, to work out its details, and to
implement it would be a sizable task. But it is a task well worth
undertaking.
CONCLUSION

Professional power arises naturally in contexts where one person is
engaged to perform services for the benefit of another and the proper
execution of those services depends on a great accummulation of technical knowledge on the part of the provider. It arises in circumstances
where the client is inherently at a disadvantage in dealing with the professional - where there is a profound informational inequality. It is
precisely in this situation that society welcomes the adoption by service
providers of a fiduciary attitude. It is no accident that doctors, lawyers,
and other professionals spend a great deal of time developing codes of
ethics and generating a sense of professional responsibility. This process - by which the professional is encouraged to internalize the welfare of the client rather than his own income as a norm of his action is an important and valuable aspect of the process of adjusting professional power to the public interest.
Moreover, when the fiduciary spirit is allowed to express its full
force in the life and actions of an individual professional, the results
can inspire awe. Before preparing this Sobeloff Lecture, I was fortu112. 42 U.S.C. § 242n(f)(2)(B) (Supp. III 1979).
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nate to read the short biography of Judge Simon Sobeloff that was written by Michael Mayer." 3 Reading about the career of that great jurist,
I was struck by the surpassing moral beauty of a life that in its actions
and effects was dedicated to advancement of the general good. I was
moved, and personally humbled, by the account. I have felt a similar
admiration in the presence of certain members of the medical profession whom I have been privileged to meet. Not surprisingly, then, I
want to preserve the fiduciary spirit wherever it exists.
Nevertheless, observation of human nature in its more ordinary
guises convinces me that no society can rely totally on self-generated
ethical norms to assure that discretionary power is exercised for the
general good. The fiduciary spirit, and even altruism, are real, but they
need a boost from a social, economic, and legal environment that rewards them. No group of powerful men and women should be free of
sensible external controls.

113. M. MAYER, SIMON E. SOBELOFF (Michael Mayer is Judge Sobelofi's grandson, and
he prepared this pamphlet to acquaint younger lawyers and students at the University of
Maryland School of Law with his grandfather's biography).

